By definition, \emph{Encryption} is the process of converting information into a \emph{code} with the purpose of preventing unauthorized access \cite{oxford}. Traditionally, the way this was accomplished was via some a priori established secret key $k$, which could then be used both for \emph{encryption}, but also for \emph{decryption}. This concept was then challenged by the concept of \emph{Public Key Cryptography}, which allows two parties to communicate with each other in a secure and private fashion, without having already shared the aforementioned secret key. This allowed each party to have a \emph{Public Key} and a \emph{Secret Key}, which could then be used to encrypt and decrypt, respectively. This works well and is used in many applications, such as \emph{SSH} and \emph{SSL}. It does however have one caveat. \emph{Public Key Encryption} is notoriusly slow, compared to the \emph{Symmetrical}-scheme with only a single key, but if you wish to send to several people you will need to encrypt whatever you wish to send several times, once for each party and furthermore, public key encryption is very \emph{all-or-nothing}. Either a single party can decrypt what you send and see everything, or she will not be able to decrypt and thus see nothing.
% TODO: Change slightly
However, there are cases where public-key encryption is insufficient. There is often a need to specify a decryption policy in the ciphertext and only individuals who satisfy the policy can decrypt. More generally, we may want to only give access to a function of the plaintext, depending on the decryptor’s authorization. Consider a cloud service storing encrypted images. Law enforcement may require the cloud to search for images containing a particular face. Thus, the cloud needs a restricted secret key that decrypts images that contain the target face, but reveals nothing about other images. More generally, the secret key may only reveal a function of the plaintext image, for example an image that is blurred everywhere except for the target face. Traditional public-key cryptography cannot help with such tasks.
To this end, \emph{Functional Encryption} can be adopted. Essentially, in functional encryption systems, the decryption key allows the user to learn a specific, pre-defined \emph{function} of the encrypted data, rather than necessarily the actual encrypted data, note that if this function is the \emph{Identity function}, then the system will be equivalent to regular public key encryption. In a functional encryption system for some functionality $F(\cdot, \cdot)$, an authority holding a master secret key $MSK$ can generate a secret key $sk_k$ which enables the computation of the function $F(k,\cdot)$. So given some plaintext $x$, one can compute $F(k,x)$, given only the ciphertext $c$ of $x$.
Full blown functional encryption is however quite a mouthful to implement in an efficient manner and as such there are some subclasses of it. This paper will focus on \emph{Identity Based Encryption (IBE)} and \emph{Broadcast Encryption (BE)}.
% TODO: Explain IBE intuitively
\section{Syntax and preliminaries}
\subsection{Identity-Based Encryption}
\textbf{Identity-Based Encryption.}\quad An Identity-Based encryption scheme is specified by four different algorithms, all containing some sort of randomness: \texttt{Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt}: \vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Setup:}\quad Takes some security parameter $k$ and returns the system parameters and a master-key. These system parameters include a description of a finite message space $\mathcal{M}$ as well as a description of a finite ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. These parameters are known publicly, wherre the master-key is known only to the trusted authority, the so called Private Key Generator (\texttt{PKF}). \vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Extract:}\quad Takes the system parameters, the master-key and an arbitrary \texttt{ID}$\in\{0,1\}^*$ and returns a private key $d$. \texttt{ID} is essentially any arbitrary string which will be used a public key and $d$ is the corresponding decryption key, which can be used by the owner of the \texttt{ID}. Thus, the \texttt{extract} algorithm extracts a private key from the given public key. \vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Encrypt:}\quad Takes the system parameters, \texttt{ID}, and $M \in\mathcal{M}$. Returns some ciphertext $C \in\mathcal{C}$.\vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Decrypt:}\quad Takes the system parameters, some private key $d$ and $C \in\mathcal{C}$. Returns the plaintext $M \in\mathcal{M}$. \vspace{3mm}\\
Naturally, these algorithms must satisfy that:
$$\forall M \in M\ :\ \text{Decrypt}(\text{params}, C, d)= M\quad\text{where}\quad C =\text{Encrypt}(\text{params}, ID, M)$$
\textbf{Chosen Ciphertext Security.}\quad To this end, we will focus on Chosen Ciphertext Security (\texttt{IND-CPA}), as this is the standard acceptable notion of security for a public key encryption scheme \cite{security_notion}. The standard definition however, is not strong enough, as we must also require that the adversary might already know of several \texttt{ID}s and decryption keys, given by the \texttt{PKG} and these should not aid the adversary in breaking the security. We define an \emph{extraction query} to be a query which yields the decryption key for a given \ID. Furthermore, the adversary is given the choice of which \ID to be challenged on, rather than it being a random public key. \cite{WeilIBE}
An Identity-Based Encryption scheme is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (\texttt{IND-ID-CPA}) if no polynomially bounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has non-negligible advantage against the Challenger in the following game \adv{E}: \vspace{4mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Setup:} The challenger is given a security parameter $k$ and he runs the \emph{Setup} algorithm explained above. This returns the public parameters and the master-key to the Challenger, who then forwards the public parameters to the adversary. \vsp{3mm}
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Phase 1:} The adversary is allowed to issue queries $q_1, \dots, q_l$ where query $q_i$ is one of two queries;
\begin{itemize}
\item An extraction query run on $\ID_i$. The challenger responds by running the \emph{Extract} algorithm on the given $\ID_i$, returning the decryption key $d_i$ corresponding to the \ID. $d_i$ is sent to the adversary.
\item A decryption query run on $\ID_i$ and some ciphertext $C_i$. First the challenger runs the \emph{Extract} algorithm to get the decryption key $d_i$ corresponding to the given $\ID_i$. The Challenger then runs the \emph{Decrypt} algorithm on $d_i$ and $C_i$, resulting in a plaintext. This plaintext is returned to the adversary.
\end{itemize}
\hsp{6mm} These queries may be run \emph{adaptively}, hence the name of the security definition, thus, each query $q_i$ may depend on the previous queries $q_1,\dots,q_{i-1}$, if the adversary so desires. \vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm}\textbf{Challenge:} Once the adversary deems that Phase 1 is over, he outputs two plaintexts of equal length; $M_0, M_1\in\mathcal{M}$, as well as an \ID on which he desires to be challenged. The single constraint, is that the adversary is not allowed to have queried this \ID before, in Phase 1. The Challenger then picks a bit $b \in_R \{0,1\}$ and sets $C = Encrypt(params, \ID, M_b)$. $C$ is then send to the adversary. \vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm}\textbf{Phase 2:} The adversary is allowed to issue additional $n-l$ queries; $q_{l+1},\dots,q_n$, where query $q_i$ is either of:
\begin{itemize}
\item An extraction query run on $\ID_i$. The same query, except $\ID_i \neq\ID$, where \ID is the \ID of the challenge.
\item A decryption query run on $\ID_i$ and some ciphertext $C_i$. The same query, except $\ID_i \neq\ID$ and $C_i \neq C$, where $C$ is the ciphertext of the challenge.
\end{itemize}
\hsp{6mm} These queries may be run adaptively, as in Phase 1. \vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm}\textbf{Guess:} The adversary outputs a guess bit $b' \in\{0,1\}$ and he will win the game if $b' = b$. \vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm} An adversary \adv{A} as defined above, is refered to as an \texttt{IND-ID-CPA} adversary. The advantage of \adv{A} in defeating the Challenger in the scheme \adv{E}, is defined as a function of the security parameter $k$, $Adv_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}= |Pr(b=b')-\frac{1}{2}|$.
This definition closely resembles the standard definition of \texttt{IND-CPA} but extended with the addition of extraction queries and that the challenger is now challenged on an \ID picked by the adversary. The addition of the extraction queries is supported by \cite{ExtractionDef}, when the scheme is to support multiple users, which is likely the case for any IBE scheme. Furthermore, the weaker notion of security known as \emph{Semantic Security} (\texttt{IND-ID-CPA}) can be defined based on \texttt{IND-ID-CCA}, except now the adversary is not allowed to issue any decryption queries, i.e. he is only allowed extraction queries.
% TODO: Write of the Threshold Public Key Encryption Scheme; https://www.di.ens.fr/david.pointcheval/Documents/Papers/2008_crypto.pdf
% TODO: Write up the different security definitions for BE systems, Static, Semi-Static and Adaptive
\subsection{Mathmatical Assumptions}
All of the following mathmatical assumptions will be derived from the \emph{Diffie-Hellman} assumption. The reader is assumed to be familiar with this.
\subsubsection{The BDHE Assumption}
This is defined for a specific $m$ which could for instance be taken as a parameter. Let \G and \Gp{_T} be groups of order $p$ with a bilinear map $e: \Gm\times\Gm\rightarrow\Gmp{_T}$ and let $g \in G$ be a generator. Set $a,s \in_R \Z^*_p$ and $b \in_R \{0,1\}$. If $b=0$, then set $Z = e(g,g)^{a^{m+1}\cdot s}$; $Z \in_R \Gm_T$ otherwise. The problem is then, given $g^s, Z, \{g^{a^i}: i \in[0,m]\cup[m+2, 2m]\}$, what is the value of $b$?
\section{Broadcast Encryption}
Broadcast Encryption systems \cite{BEDef} in a nutshell, allows one sender to send to a subset $S \subseteq[n]$ of users with a single message. Traditionally, the user would have to encrypt this message once per user in a horribly inefficient manner. This is fixed, by defining the encryption key in such a way to allow for any user within the $S$ to decrypt the message, while not allowing anyone outside of $S$ to do so. It is preferable for this kind of schem to be \emph{public key based}, rather than symmetric. This allows any user to encrypt. It should allow \emph{stateless receivers} s.t. users won't need to keep any state such as updating a private key, and the system should be \emph{fully collusion resistant}, i.e. not allow decryption even if everybody outside of the set $S$ cooperated.
In a sense, Broadcast Encryption Systems can be related to notion of \emph{Threshold Public Key Encryption Systems} (\texttt{TPKE}) if we define the authorized set of the \texttt{TPKE} system to be equal to $S$ and the threshold parameter $t$ is set to be $1$. This is only true however, for the specific value of $t=1$, thus, specialized systems can be designed for the purpose of being broadcast encryption systems. In this paper we will focus on a scheme due to Gentry and Waters \cite{GentryWaters}.
% TODO, maybe new page this
\subsection{Their construction}
\label{GentryWatersConst}
Let $GroupGen(\lambda,n)$ be an algorithm which generates a group \G and \Gp{_T} of prime order $p = poly(\lambda, n) > n$ with a bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}\times\mathbb{G}\rightarrow\mathbb{G}_T$, based on a security parameter $\lambda$. \vsp{5mm}
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Setup$(n,n)$:}\quad Run $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)\xleftarrow{R} GroupGen(\lambda, n)$. Set $\alpha\in_R \Z_p$ and $g,h_1,\dots,h_n \in_R \mathbb{G}^{n+1}$. Finally, set $PK =(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e), g, e(g,g)^\alpha, h_1, \dots, h_n$. The secret key is $SK = g^\alpha$. The result is the pair $(PK, SK)$. \vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{KeyGen$(i, SK)$:}\quad Set $r_i \in_R \Z_p$ and output; $$d_i \leftarrow(d_{i,0},\dots,d_{i,n})\quad\text{ where }\quad d_{i,0}= g^{-r_i}, \quad d_{i,i}= g^\alpha h^{r_i}_i, \quad d_{i,j \text{ for } i\neq j} h^{r_i}_j$$\vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Encrypt$(S, PK)$:}\quad Set $t \in_R \Z_p$ and $$Hdr =(C_1,C_2), \quad\text{ where }\quad C_1= g^t, \quad C_2=(\prod_{i \in S}h_i)^t $$ Finally, set $K = e(g,g)^{t\cdot\alpha}$. Output $(K, Hdr)$. \vspace{3mm}\\
\-\hspace{5mm}\textbf{Decrypt$(S,i,d_i,\text{Hdr}, PK)$:}\quad Check if $i \in S$, if so; let $d_i =(d_{i,0},\dots,d_{i,n})$, Hdr$=(C_1,C_2)$, output $$k =e(d_{i,i}\cdot\prod_{j \in S \setminus\{i\}} d_{i,j}, C_1)\cdot e(d_{i,0}, C_2)$$\vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm}\textbf{Correctness:}\quad Correctness is given by;
\begin{align*}
K &= e(d_{i,i}\cdot\prod_{j \in S \setminus\{i\}} d_{i,j}, C_1) \cdot e(d_{i,0}, C_2) \\
The proof is a reduction from their construction to the \emph{BDHE}-problem. The scheme is proven secure in the semi-static model. We note that the proof in the original paper does not hold, likely due to a typo, but we'll emphasize the fix.
We wish to build an algorithm \adv{B}, which will use an adversary \adv{A} of the system described in \ref{GentryWatersConst}, to break the \emph{BDHE} problem. \vsp{4mm}
\hsp{5mm}\adv{B} receives a problem instance which contains $g^s, Z, \{g^{a^i}: i \in[0,m]\cup[m+2, 2m]\}$. \vsp{3mm}
\hsp{5mm}\textbf{Init:}\quad\adv{A} commits to a set $\tilde{S}\subseteq[n]$. \vsp{3mm}
g^{y_i + a^{i}}&\text{ for } i \in [1,n] \setminus\tilde{S}
\end{cases}
$$
\adv{B} then sets $\alpha= y_0\cdot a^{n+1}$. $PK$ is then defined as the scheme dictates where the only oddity is $e(g,g)^\alpha$, which can be computed as $e(g^a,g^{a^{n}})^{y_0}$ due to the definition of $\alpha$. $PK$ is sent to \adv{A}.
I'll cover a basic identity based encryption scheme which illustrates a basic usage of bilinear maps as well as one way to extend the \emph{Diffie-Hellman Assumption} known from Public Key Encryption. This scheme is not secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (\texttt{IND-ID-CCA}). Note that it can be extended to cover this, but this is out of the scope of this paper.
As already mentioned, an IBE-scheme is a collection of four randomized algorithms: \texttt{Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt}. $k$ is defined to be a security parameter given to the setup algorithm and $\mathcal{G}$ is a BDH parameter generator.
\subsection{Adaptive Security in Broadcast Encryption Systems}
