diff --git a/notes.org b/notes.org
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--- a/notes.org
+++ b/notes.org
@@ -1242,4 +1242,14 @@ access the resources. It’s a web server offering an OAuth API to authenticate
 - As a malicious peer does not wish to deliver the announced piece, it keeps other peers permanently choked.
 - The impact of attacks is generally more effective when performed by many peers acting in collusion. In the specific case of making a piece ever rarer, we expect more peers to make the attack more harmful. The more peers lie about a given piece, the more frequent it will appear to become, and thus in practice the rarer in fact it will be.
 **** Eclipsing Correct Peers
+- If an attacker has enough physical resources or creates great number of Sybils, it can attack a swarm using a large number of malicious peers.
+- The same set of peers can attack multiple swarms
+- In an Eclipse attack, a set of malicious, colluding peers arranges for a correct node to peer only with members of the coalition. If successful, the attacker can mediate most or all communication to and from the victim.
+- In BitTorrent, this attack inserts a sufficiently high amount of evil peers, so correct ones connect mostly, or only, with evil ones.
+- A peer can by default connect to 55, thus one only need 55 evil peers to mess with one good one.
+**** Evaluation
+- 25 piece liers are inserted. There liars state they have the same 4 pieces, effectively causing this pieces to eventually disappear, as no other peers wants them, according to most rare first. This halts the network after relatively short time, as no leachers can turn to seeders, as no leachers can finish their download.
+- In general, more liars means a slower network.
+- Sybil attacks are in general effective, more become more and more effective, as the amount of sybils increase.
+- Results indicate that BitTorrent is susceptible to attacks in which malicious peers in collusion lie about the possession of pieces and make them artificially rarer.